Análisis del endeudamiento y los costos de agencia en el Ecuador: el caso del sector manufacturero y comercial (2019-2022)

Abstract

The divergence of interests between shareholders and managers plays a crucial role in a company's financing decisions. This conflict is known as agency costs. The objective of this study is to analyze the effect of agency costs, represented by managerial salaries and operating expenses, on capital structure and their impact on the debt level of commercial and manufacturing companies in Ecuador from 2019 to 2022. The analysis is based on data from the Structural Business Survey (ENESEM) and the Superintendency of Companies. Using a static panel data econometric model, the results present a balanced panel with fixed individual and temporal effects. The findings show that agency costs have a significant and negative impact on the level of indebtedness. The results validate the pecking order and agency theories, highlighting the need for effective internal strategies to align the interests of managers and shareholders.