Evidence About the Moral Hazard in the Ecuadorian Health System

Abstract

Resumen

The aim of this study is to estimate the presenceof moral hazard in the Ecuadorian health system, understood as an over-utilization of it. For this, a binomial logit model, which measures the probability of use of health services between insured and uninsured people is used. The results show evidence ofmoral hazard for individuals who are insured, mainly for adults over 60 years. In addition, it is noted thatwhenhaving extra expenses that are not covered by insurance, insured people tend to reduce the use of medical services.

Keywords

Moral Hazard, Asymmetric information, Health Insurance, Health system, Health services

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