La imputación objetiva en los estados de inconciencia, y su ubicación dogmática en la teoría del delito en el Código Orgánico integral penal

Abstract

The action as an autonomous category of the General Theory of Crime has generated great doctrinal debates. Different theories have expressed their point of view regarding this category, giving very diverse content; starting from The Causal Theory, passing by The Final Theory, until eventually reaching the projections of The Functionalist Theories. During the development of the dogmatic action content, the different theories have agreed that there must be causal factors that exclude the content itself; among those situations, are reflex movements, states of unconsciousness and the irresistible physical force. In this work, we only focus in the study of the states of unconsciousness. In the words of the majority of criminal writers, these circumstances are not absolute, and cannot, in all cases, exclude the action or be considered as causes of the absence of the action. For that reason, this graduation project has used the Objective Imputation of the result in order to attribute the criminal conduct and the result caused in circumstances of complete unconsciousness, and therefore being the most suitable and accurate normative theory type. Furthermore, with the application of the Theory of Objective Imputation, we can formulate a concrete answer, that is to say, when the circumstances are exclusionary causes of the action, when they exclude the typical, and under what assumptions are the agents considered not criminally liable or attributed by a diminished responsibility.