Aplicación de teoría de juegos en la gestión de Aceites Comestibles Usados en el Ecuador

Abstract

The management of Used Cooking Oils (UCOs) in Ecuador faces challenges due to the lack of involvement of all stakeholders in its life cycle, which leads to inadequate management and environmental pollution problems. The objective of this research was to use game theory for decision making in LCA management. The current legislation related to waste management in the country was examined and three static game models with complete information and pure strategies, which describe the interaction between the key actors involved, were proposed. In the first model, which corresponds to the Autonomous Decentralized Municipal Governments and residents, it was identified that the maximum utility for both is achieved when they manage and recycle, respectively. In the second model, which includes the national government, the hotel, restaurant and cafeteria sector (HORECA) and LCA managers, it was observed that equilibrium is reached when the government does not supervise, the HORECA recycles and the managers buy the waste, encouraged by government policies. In the third model, which contemplates the National Government, the HORECA sector and biofuel producing companies, it was found that the balance is achieved when the government supervises, the HORECA recycles and the companies buy the waste. In conclusion, the need for an Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) structure for the financing of LCA management at the municipal level is highlighted, in addition to incentives and sanctions from the National Government to encourage the involvement of the other actors.