Evasión en los impuestos a la plusvalía y alcabalas para la ciudad de Cuenca: un análisis a partir de teoría de juegos

Abstract

In this thesis we has been realized a brief analysis of tax evasion of taxes on capital gains and sales taxes levied on housing in the city of Cuenca, using game theory and experiment as tools of economic analysis. There have been applications from the perspective of a single economy and a simulation with Lara model. The games established indicated in the first instance that the best response of the players in the environment of evading a simple economy, reaching a Nash equilibrium ; secondly, in the case of Tax Administrator the best strategy is to always check that the inspection costs are lower than the estimated revenue. On the economic experiment the legalization process of buying and selling a home is simulated. The results of the experiment revealed that the collusion between taxpayers against the sale price stated is one of forms of tax evasion, and that the transfer price of home factor is related to the behavior of individuals evader.

This research is just a starting point for the use of game theory to measure evasión; it limited to make an aproximation to the behavior of the taxes Plusvalía and Alcabalas taxpayers to Cuenca.